In this article I address a puzzle about one of Francis Hutcheson’s objections to psychological egoism. The puzzle concerns his premise that God receives no benefit from rewarding the virtuous. Why, in the early editions of his Inquiry Concerning Virtue (1725, 1726), does Hutcheson leave this premise undefended? And why, in the later editions (1729, 1738), does he continue to do so, knowing that in 1726 John Clarke of Hull had subjected the premise to plausible criticism, geared to the (...) very audience (mainly Christian) for whom Hutcheson’s objection to egoism was written? This puzzle is not negligible. Some might claim that Hutcheson ruins his objection by ignoring Clarke’s criticism. To answer the puzzle we must consider not only Hutcheson’s philosophy but also some theological assumptions of Hutcheson’s time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spectres of False Divinity: Hume’s Moral AtheismJohn J. TilleyThomas Holden. Spectres of False Divinity: Hume’s Moral Atheism. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvi + 246. Cloth, $50.00.Thomas Holden argues that a key element of David Hume’s irreligious agenda is his case for moral atheism. According to Holden, Hume defends (conclusively, Hume believes) not merely weak moral atheism, according to which there is no morally praiseworthy deity, (...) but strong moral atheism, according to which there is no deity with any moral characteristics. The idea here is that if any being approximates the traditional notion of God as a first cause or designer, it cannot meet the preconditions for having moral attributes. Holden also discusses arguments that some might expect to be central to Hume’s case but which, according to Holden, are not. For instance, Holden maintains that Hume does not even endorse the evidential argument from evil, let alone use it to support moral atheism. Instead, Hume intends it as a parody of traditional natural theology. Holden closes with several points about the historical and philosophical import of Hume’s moral atheism.Right from the start, Holden faces challenges. How can he square his interpretation of Hume as a moral atheist with Hume’s repeated strictures against theological speculation? And how can he square his interpretation with the fact that Hume never explicitly advocates moral atheism?Holden skillfully meets these challenges. Regarding the first challenge, for example, he distinguishes “core natural theology,” which aims at knowledge of the deity’s distinctive, intrinsic properties, from “liminal natural theology,” which lacks such aims. This distinction, Holden contends, reconciles two elements of Hume’s philosophy that seem to conflict. The first is Hume’s rejection of theological speculation as beyond our cognitive capacities. The second is Hume’s frequent willingness to draw conclusions about divine attributes. Holden argues that although Hume’s strictures against theological speculation pertain to [End Page 297] core natural theology, they are not aimed at liminal natural theology—that is, at speculation about the deity’s non-distinctive or relational properties. Hume’s defense of moral atheism, Holden believes, falls within liminal natural theology.After addressing challenges to his reading of Hume, Holden discusses Hume’s arguments for strong moral atheism. These do not stand out in Hume’s writings (though many of their components do), but Holden finds them there. He does so not through overly imaginative reconstruction but through careful interpretation, with an eye on many texts.Hume’s first argument, the “argument from sentimentalism,” draws on Hume’s theory of the passions and his sentimentalist metaethics. Holden reconstructs it as follows. S1: The deity is not a natural object of any human passion. S2: Moral sentiments are a species of human passion. S3: If a being is not a natural object of the moral sentiments, then it cannot have moral attributes (either virtues or vices). Therefore, S4: The deity cannot have moral attributes. The first premise is the least familiar of the three, and Holden devotes considerable effort to clarifying it, examining Hume’s rationale for it, and addressing objections to it. He performs similar tasks regarding S2, S3, and the argument in general. For instance, he addresses at length three possible objections to the argument, his concern being that if they were sufficiently damaging (he argues that they are not), this might tell against interpreting Hume as advancing the argument.Hume’s second argument, the “argument from motivation,” goes roughly as follows. Although we know nothing about the deity’s distinctive intrinsic properties, we have good reason to think that most likely, the deity (like any unknown being picked out in advance) lacks a sentimental nature anything like ours. But without a sentimental nature akin to ours, a being’s behavior is not intelligible in human terms—for example, it cannot be said to reflect moral concern or such motives as malice and benevolence. And if a being’s behavior is not intelligible in human terms, that being is not morally assessable, which is to say that it lacks moral attributes. Thus, we should conclude that the deity most likely lacks such attributes. Holden... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WHAT VOEGELIN MISSED IN THE GOSPEL John J. Ranieri Seton Hall University Violence and order are the themes that structure Voegelin's work. From the early writings composed in response to the emergence of National Socialism to the closing years ofhis life in which he confessed to a "perhaps misplaced sensitivity towards murder"1 as the primary catalyst for his philosophical pursuits, Voegelin is preoccupied with the relationship between the (...) good of order and the violence that can both undermine and preserve that order. His theory of consciousness, his philosophy of history, and his "new science ofpolitics" form a complementary whole when understood as expressions of his lifelong concern to find ways to guard against social and political chaos. This preoccupation with order makes Voegelin especially wary of any social, political, or religious movements which, in his view, contribute to the dissolution ofsocial stability. It is in this context that his uneasy relationship with the Bible must be understood. While acknowledging the importance of the Jewish and Christian scriptures in the historical unfolding of the differentiation ofthe divine Beyond, Voegelin also maintains that many of the forces of disorder in modern society have been generated within their orbit.2 The dazzling intensity ofthe encounter with the biblical God can lead to dissatisfaction with life in this world, resulting in reactions of either withdrawal from the surrounding culture or the more immediately de- '"Autobiographical Statement at Age 82" in 77¡e Beginning and the Beyond: Papersfrom the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences (117). 2See Order and History, vol. 1, Israel and Revelation (xii-xiv); Order and History, vol. 4, The Ecumenic Age (20, 27); "The Gospel and Culture," in The Collected Works ofEric Voegelin,vo\. 12, Published Essays, 1966-1985(200-210). 126John J. Ranieri structive alternative of trying, by whatever means necessary, to bring a recalcitrant society into conformity with the divine perfection. As revelation of the "God beyond the gods" the Old and New Testaments are unsurpassable expressions ofthe transcendent source of order. At the same time, they are the seedbeds in which social upheaval easily germinates. As generators of both order and disorder, few biblical books have been as influential as the four gospels. It is Voegelin's treatment ofthese texts that will be my concern here. The ambiguity ofVoegelin's relationship to the gospels is reflected in the twofold meaning ofthe word "missed" in the title ofthis essay. In the first place, the word can be understood as referring to Voegelin's critique ofthe gospels; to speak ofwhat Voegelin "missed" in this sense is to focus on that which he finds lacking in them (yet wishes were there). My primary interest, however, is on the meaning ofthe word as indicating that which Voegelin fails to understand about the gospels. The two meanings are related; for it is in Voegelin's criticism of the gospels that we can detect the manner in which he misunderstands them. In order to make this clear, it is necessary to say something about his evaluation and critique; only then will it be possible to raise relevant questions about his approach. After summarizing Voegelin's perspective on the gospels, I introduce the thought of René Girard as possible counterpoint. This is followed by a comparison of Voegelin and Girard with regard to their understanding ofthe gospel texts. A concluding section offers reflections on Voegelin's evaluation ofthe gospels. I realize that there is little to be gained from finding fault with a thinker for not doing what it was never his intention to do in the first place. At times, some of Voegelin's Christian critics succumb to this tendency when they berate him for what they consider to be his failure to satisfy the litmus test of Christian orthodoxy.3 Apart from the difficulty of defining Christian orthodoxy, these kinds of charges overlook the fact that Voegelin does not consider himself to be a Christian theologian, and that his "concern with 3 Of course, the question as to whether Voegelin's philosophy is adequate as a foundation for Christian theology may be an important one for the theologian to consider. But Voegelin does not see himself as providing such a foundation. For critics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms by James T. Bretzke, SJJohn J. FitzgeraldHandbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms James T. Bretzke, SJ washington, dc: georgetown university press, 2013. 260 pp. $24.95The Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms continues the recent sequence of concise dictionaries published by Georgetown University Press, including the Key Words volumes for various religions and A Handbook of Bioethics Terms. James Bretzke’s contribution is especially (...) welcome as it is the first such English-language reference work in Catholic moral theology since the Second Vatican Council. The author covers fundamental, social, medical, and sexual issues while providing frequent cross-references and further readings. Special attention is also given to scripture and ethics, the history of moral theology, the nature and authority of the Magisterium, canon law, Protestant thought, and moral philosophy. The longest entries are those on dissent (67–70), Humanae vitae (111–16), infallibility (122–24), and the Pontifical Commission on Births (180–82), which in advance of Humanae vitae produced the well-known Majority Report favorable to the use of contraception. The sections on these vexed issues delve into some of the relevant arguments from different sides.Given its space constraints as a portable paperback, the Handbook covers an impressive amount of historical and contemporary ground. The eight-hundred-plus entries are generally clear and irenic, and often illuminating. Consider the page-long entry on just war theory (131–32), which succinctly summarizes its development from Augustine to the present-day Catechism, calls attention to the importance of ius post bellum alongside the traditional categories of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and outlines four possible critiques of the theory. Particularly helpful throughout are the various examples the author provides. For instance, in the course of explaining that moral norms and human laws may not bind at all times, he suggests that it is justifiable to forgo the duty to sustain life when this can only be done through extraordinary means (140), or to exceed the speed limit in case of a medical emergency (15, 81; see also 183 and 239–40 for other relevant examples).On the other hand, a few key topics are either overlooked or not fully dealt with. This book rightly highlights ecumenical ethics (77–78 and passim), but there is essentially no coverage of Eastern Orthodoxy and very little on pre-twentieth-century Protestant thought. In addition, considering the prevalence of a “morality-of-happiness” perspective in historical and modern-day Catholic thought, and given Bretzke’s own thorough attention to law, the book might have incorporated separate entries on happiness and grace, law’s complement. [End Page 221] (To his credit, he does mention grace several times—a fact that the preface points out—and includes the beatific vision, Gloria Dei vivens homo, and Summum Bonum among his definitions.) And speaking of law, the author’s treatment of the divine law is slightly confusing; he appears to alternately conflate it with and differentiate it from both the eternal law and the law of the Old and New Testaments (70–71, 136, 138).In the end, despite Bretzke’s best efforts to remain above the ideological frays of moral theology, one’s overall evaluation of his book may depend somewhat on one’s place within them. Some will chafe at his suggestions that contraception (116), certain forms of assisted reproduction (198–99), and artificial nutrition and hydration that sustain those in a persistent vegetative state (10, 224–25) remain open questions to an extent. Others will point out, as Bretzke does, that Church doctrine has previously undergone substantial development on other issues, such as religious freedom (65–66, 151, 193, 229) and the charging of interest (107, 241). What most should be able to agree upon is that in many respects the Handbook is a valuable resource, one that will help professionals and students alike come to a much better understanding of the key terms and debates within the field. [End Page 222]John J. FitzgeraldSt. John’s University (New York)Copyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast (...) between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives involved in virtue and in its practice as understood by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us. (shrink)

I have argued that like Harry Frankfurt, Augustine implicitly distinguishes between first-order desires and higher-order volitions; yet unlike Frankfurt, Augustineheld that the liberty to form different possible volitional identifications is essential to responsibility for our character. Like Frankfurt, Augustine recognizes that we can sometimes be responsible for the desires on which we act without being able to do or desire otherwise; but for Augustine, this is true only because such responsibility for inevitable desires and actions traces (at least in part) (...) to responsibility for our volitional identifications, which in turn has leeway-libertarianconditions. However, David Hunt has interpreted Augustine’s account of divine foreknowledge as implying a type of source-incompatibilism that does not require alternative possible actions or intentions. Moreover, while Eleonore Stump’s account of Augustine on sanctification supports my interpretation, Augustine’s position on predestination in his latest writings may be incompatible with liberty of the higher-order will. I will argue against Hunt’s interpretation but admit that the leeway-libertarian has to reject the ‘no autonomy’ model in some of Augustine’s late writings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Political Philosophy of Fénelon by Ryan Patrick HanleyJohn J. Conley SJRyan Patrick Hanley. The Political Philosophy of Fénelon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvi + 306. Hardback, $41.95.In his monograph, Ryan Patrick Hanley offers a revisionist interpretation of the political philosophy of François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, archbishop of Cambrai. A series of Enlightenment commentators (Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Jefferson) and their progeny have hailed Fénelon (...) as a political subversive who boldly attacked the injustices of the reign of Louis XIV and who prepared the arrival of an egalitarian society with socialist and pacifist traits. Hanley, however, argues that Fénelon actually defended a more moderate and realistic model of political society than his Enlightenment exegetes have suggested. Like earlier commentators, Hanley attempts to prove his argument primarily through an analysis of Telemachus, the pedagogical novel Fénelon had composed for Louis, duc de Bourgogne, the "petit Dauphin" and grandson of Louis XIV, when Fénelon served as his tutor.Three strong chapters demonstrate Hanley's thesis concerning Fénelon's moderate politics and philosophy. Hanley argues that Fénelon's philosophy of education rests on a distinction between true and false glory. True glory resides in virtue and a humble recognition of divine glory, while false glory is the self-centered glorification of the human agent, which easily deteriorates into vanity. Rather than simply condemn self-interest, in his treatment of the education of the prince Fénelon argues that self-interest must be gradually transformed into a broader interest for the good of one's subjects and a deeper recognition of the glory of God. Earning the praise of his Enlightenment acolytes and later feminist commentators, Fénelon defends a solid education for women, but he clearly wants this education to prepare women for their domestic role as wives and mothers; his celebrated treatise and letters on the education of women are not an exercise in gender equality.The economic theory of Fénelon has often been interpreted as a type of utopian socialism. This is largely based on the central place taken by Bétique in the Telemachus. In this mythical land, the happy citizens practice a communist economics; private property is foreign to them. All their basic needs are provided for through communal cooperation. Luxury is also foreign to them; precious metals like gold and silver are used in practical construction as if they were pieces of iron. But Hanley argues that the prosocialist exegetes ignore the varied economies presented in the passages concerning Egypt, Crete, and Tyre. Bétique does not stand alone as an economic ideal. When Fénelon details how the economy of contemporary France should be reformed, it is far from simple socialism. The state has a strong initial role in the state's economic reform, but it works in tandem with private initiatives that will gradually become the stronger partner. "Fénelon differs from later socialists in insisting that the use of state power is not an end in itself, but necessary only to establish the conditions whereby a free economic system can emerge and flourish—at which point direct intervention of the state into economic affairs will diminish, and a free (though hardly unbridled) pursuit of self-interest will be encouraged" (81).Hanley also attacks the common argument that Fénelon is a pacifist who excoriates all recourse to war. Fénelon does indeed condemn war in the most graphic terms. As Archbishop of Cambrai in northern France, he had witnessed the brutal carnage and attendant famines that had decimated the population in repeated wars in this border area. But his nuanced critique of war rests on a distinction between false and true courage. False courage is found in the warrior who initiates war for the sake of his own false glory. True courage lies in those who defend the innocent out of a proper sense of duty; this courage contrasts with cowardice disguised as pacificism. Hanley argues that the confederation of nations that Fénelon envisions as a mechanism to mediate conflict and reduce the recourse to war is less a species of international government than... (shrink)

One answer to the perennial question of how to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is the “Eternity Solution” (espoused by Thomas Aquinas): God is outside of time, and therefore it is incorrect to say he has foreknowledge. However, in the case of prophecy, God’s knowledge seems to be inserted into the temporal order and thereby transformed into foreknowledge. The eternalist might address this problem in a few ways, but the best answer appears to be that inevitable actions can (...) be free in some sense. At the same time, this answer seems to either (a) ironically lead to the abandonment of the Eternity Solution in favor of other solutions to the foreknowledge/ freedom problem or (b) call for a coherent explanation of the idea that freedom is relatively limited in instances of prophecy and for a revision (or at least clarification) of Aquinas’s views on human freedom and divine non-passivity. (shrink)

THE most prevalent interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy charges him with a glorification and even a divinization of the Prussian State of his day at the expense of the freedom of the individual. This interpretation has its origins in the existentialist critique of Hegel. Kierkegaard, for example, in his evaluation of Hegel’s philosophy of history abhors the apparent deification of the existing State as the manifestation of the Objective Spirit since it robs the individual of his freedom, responsibility, and dignity. (...) ‘The derelict Hegelian ethics, with its desperate attempt to make the State the court of last resort, is a most unethical attempt to reduce the individual to finitude.…’ Karl Popper has helped to perpetuate this interpretation by the existentialists by claiming that according to Hegel ‘the State is everything and the individual nothing’. William Shirer has claimed that one can trace the rise of the second and third Reichs to Hegel’s ‘ringing glorification of the State as supreme in human life’. In determining the validity of this interpretation we shall examine Hegel’s statements on the nature of the ideal State, his evaluations of existing States and ancient States, and his detailed position on the rights of citizens within his ideal State. (shrink)

This article investigates William James's reading of the concepts of selflessness and transcendence in relation to the Chan and Pure Land schools of Chinese Buddhism. The divide between Chan and Pure Land Buddhism may be mediated if we attend to aspects of the two traditions that James found particularly meaningful. James is drawn to selflessness as presented in the concept of emptiness in the Chan understanding of meditative experience. He is equally interested in Buddhist devotional practices of Pure Land that (...) claim to open individuals and their communities to the divine. James saw these two aspects as deeply compatible. (shrink)

Despite its plurality of forms and doctrines Christianity does contain a constant religious doctrinal core based on a putative continuity between Jesus' teaching and the church's kerygma. Its elements are: 1) human salvation through divine forgiveness; 2) the fact of decisive divine intervention in history to bring us salvation; 3) acknowledgement of the role of Jesus as supreme mediator of that salvation through his ministry and teaching (but not through an atoning death); 4) possible acceptance of the Resurrection (...) in some sense. A minimal, though untraditional, Christian orthodoxy might consist of faith in God and in Jesus as Saviour (or Lord), interpreting these formulae in terms of these three or four elements. (shrink)

This paper argues that St. Thomas distinguishes between what natural reason can know about the interior Word in God and what can be known by faith alone. I will argue that reason can show that verbum names a pure perfection that must exist in any intellectual nature and that verbum is therefore, in this sense, predicated properly of the divine nature. Thus, our natural understanding of verbum serves as a preamble to faith. But the real procession of the Word (...) within God (and the distinction of persons that follows from real procession) is revealed by faith alone. But even here, reason can be used in the service of faith to show how the procession of the word in the human soul functions as a fitting likeness or analogy to help manifest the procession of the eternal Word. (shrink)

Volume 1 of this work, subtitled Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason and reviewed in these pages by Dallas Laskey, is a study of human creative processes, for it is, Tymieniecka argues, the creative imagination and the will which are the wellspring of all human life. These creative processes, which are to be understood as "man's self-interpretation-in-existence," reach their natural or worldly pinnacle in historical, cultural communities with their poetic, moral, and intelligible productions. Such communities, however, emerging and decaying (...) in turn, cannot confer an ultimate significance on human life. Hence, the present volume turns its attention to the elucidation of the "transnatural destiny" of the human being, of the ways in which human creativity orients us toward the divine. This elucidation of the experience of the divine will complete the account of human creativity because we shall discover that the divine reveals itself to us in human inwardness, in the human formulation of the sacred message: "the ciphering of the sacred message advances through man's self-ciphering-in-the-sacred.". (shrink)

How close is spirituality to psychosis? Covering the interrelation of psychosis and spirituality from a number of angles, _Insanity and Divinity_ will generate dialogue and discussion, aid critical reflection and stimulate creative approaches to clinical work for those interested in the connections between religious studies, psychoanalysis, anthropology and hagiography. Bringing together an international range of contributors and covering many different types of religious experience, this book presents its theme in three parts: Psychoanalysis, belief and mysticism Anthropology, history and hagiography Psychology, (...) psychosis and religious experience. Each section includes discussion of the hinterland between madness and religious experience from the perspective of a number of religions, autobiographical accounts of those who have experienced a psychosis in which spirituality played a key part and a comprehensive review of the position of psychology research into the meaning and function of spirituality in relation to the psychoses. Insightful, enlightening and wide-ranging, _Insanity and Divinity_ is ideal for clinicians, academics and chaplains working in clinical settings. (shrink)

This book examines the central ideas that defined the debate about divine production in the Trinity in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, namely those of Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. Their discussions are significant for the history of trinitarian theology and the history of philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 369 On Divine Foreknowledge. (Part IV of the Concordia). By Lms DE MOLINA. Trans. Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xii +286. $34.95. The contents of the sixteenth century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina's famous work are specified in its title: Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia-" The Agreement of Free Choice with the Gifts of Grace, (...) Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Reprobation." Part IV, which particularly concerns the Divine Fore· knowledge, is divided into seven " Disputations," 47-53 inclusive. These deal with contingency, the presence of all things to God in eternity, God's knowledge of future contingents (including the role of the Divine Ideas), and especially the reconciliation of freedom and contingency with absolutely certain Divine Foreknowledge and Predeterminations. It is Part IV, especially Disputation 52, which contains Molina's well known teaching about the scientia media, God's "middle knowledge," i.e., eternally between the natural knowledge He has of all things possible and the free or post-volitional (according to our way of conceiving it) knowledge He has of all things actual. More precisely, by middle knowledge God knows, before any exercise of His will, what a created free agent would do in various circumstances, both those which actually will obtain and those which, although possible, will never in fact exist. The objects of such knowledge are situated between what is merely possible and what will simply he at some moment of time. They are possible with a certain hypothetical (ex hypothesi) dependence on both Divine and human free causation. Thus, in comprehending them as they are, God's absolutely necessary and prior knowledge would seem in some way dependent upon what is contingent and even created. Molina's doctrine attempts to overcome the paradox in this. A competent admirer of Molina's position, University of Notre Dame Professor Freddoso is not just a master of the Jesuit's baroque Latin, with its sesquipedalian sentences bristling with spiny technical terms. He also shows himself to be a fine logician (earlier he translated portions of Ockham's Summa Logicae), with an excellent understanding of scholastic theology (in areas such as the Trinity, Christology, and the Eucharist), metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of human nature. To make the translated work even more accessible, he has in his introduction briefly treated prior parts of the Concordia as preparing the stage for Part IV, has related Molina's concerns to those of present day philosophers of religion, and has made clear the agreement as well 370 BOOK REVIEWS as the main difference between Molina and his " Banezian " opponents, whose position he summarizes from the 20th century theologian-philosopher, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. In addition, he has graced the translation with helpful footnotes. At times these identify persons mentioned by Molina, some of whom (e.g. Richard of Middleton, William Durandus, Gregory of Rimini, or Didacus de Deza [Hispalensis]) would be less than household names today for a non·medievalist. At other times, Freddoso's notes clearly and succinctly explain items of Catholic doctrine which Molina presupposes or to which he refers. Still again, they reproduce important texts of St. Thomas connected with points Molina is making. And something which I welcomed, Freddoso uses his notes frequently to recall and clarify premises of earlier arguments to which Molina later simply alludes without restatement. The translation itself is from the modern critical edition of the Concordia by Johannes Rabeneck, S.J. (Oniae et Matriti, 1953), which I would like to have seen reproduced on facing pages. Freddoso's version is accurate to the point of being literal. Despite that, however, it is amazingly readable. He does on occasion have difficulty with terms like complexio (which he specially notes on page 10) and ratio: whether to understand them subjectively or objectively-but then, doesn't everyone have the same problem? Again, while one might wonder about sentences as long as nineteen lines (e.g. page 178), they are in fact the legacy of Molina himself (cf. Disp. 52, n. 19, Rabeneck, p. 346, where the Latin runs 14 lines). Freddoso speaks of Molina's " lumbering " prose. But at the same... (shrink)

William James’s interest in psychical phenomena spanned his entire career as a scholar, yet is has been largely neglected. Few if any have adequately incorporated this quirky side of James into their critical studies of his scholarly contributions, not only in religious studies but also in philosophy and psychology. Psychical research was nevertheless very much part of James’s intellectual endeavors and, as this article shall argue, sheds light on an evolving, complex, and contradictory Jamesian cosmological realism. I will contextual James’s (...) widely discussed Varieties of Religious Experience, relying on his voluminous correspondence, and will explore various articulations of pragmatism, vis-à-vis James, John Dewey, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty, particularly as those articulations apply to scholarship in religious studies and as they shed light on a Jamesian cosmology. I will then conclude with a discussion of psychical research as it relates to epistemology and the (scientific) study of that cosmos. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Report on the Tenth European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies Conference:History as a Challenge to Buddhism and ChristianityJohn O’Grady, Elizabeth J. Harris, and Jonathan A. SeitzThe Tenth Conference of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies (ENBCS) brought together between sixty and seventy people at the Oude Abdij, Drongen, Belgium, between 27 June and 1 July 2013, to examine the theme “History as a Challenge to Buddhism and Christianity.” It was (...) a collaborative effort between the ENBCS and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The 2011 ENBCS conference had focused on whether hope was a relevant concept for Buddhists and Christians. The choice of history as a theme complemented this. It also resonated with a research concern of both KU Leuven and the Network.Five key themes were chosen for examination: the traditional Christian and Buddhist conceptions of history; Jesus and the Buddha: fact and fiction; Buddhist and Christian historiography; dangerous memory in Christianity and Buddhism; and permitting historical consciousness in Buddhism and Christianity. Each was approached from a Buddhist and a Christian perspective. An opening lecture addressed the theme “Modern Historical Consciousness and the Challenge to Religion.” In addition, eighteen research papers on Buddhist-Christian relations were given in parallel sessions on Friday evening and Saturday morning. These covered topics as various as the writings of Edmund Pezet (Pierre Gillet), Paul Knitter’s understanding of Buddhist-Christian double belonging (Achim Riggert), Keiji Nishitani and the death of God (Jonatan Navarro Estrada), the encounter of Zen Buddhism and Christianity in the works of D. T. Suzuki (Mariusz Rucki), Buddhist-Christian encounters by Han Yong Woon (Seung Chul Kim), and “Liberating the Conflict from ‘History’ in Sri Lanka” (Jude Lal Fernando).Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Münster, Germany), in the opening lecture, discussed [End Page 189] seven challenges that modern historical consciousness was posing to religion: the challenge of falsification (when historical evidence, for example, showed some doctrines cherished by believers were not taught by the founder), the challenge of uncertainty or methodological doubt, the challenge of methodological naturalism (should a natural explanation be considered more probable than a supernatural one?), the challenge of the distance between past and present, the challenge of change (religions are not static), the challenge of demystification, and the challenge of relativity (the writing of history is perspectival, conditioned by context). He stressed that it would be a blessing to religion if these challenges were faced and, throughout the conference, encouraged other speakers to face them.The first theme was tackled by Mark Blum (Berkeley, USA) from a Buddhist perspective and Jan-Olav Henriksen (Norwegian School of Theology) from a Christian perspective. In a magisterial historical and geographical survey of the Buddhist tradition, Blum first noted that no one had unearthed a traditional notion of Buddhist history in the early texts. The theme of decline and reformation had been taken from Indian cosmology, but with a Buddhist twist and the conviction that it was pointless to talk about beginnings. And in the growth of the Mahāyāna tradition, a dehistoricization of the Buddha had occurred in the belief that the Buddha’s dharma-body was his only “real” body.Henriksen argued that Christian salvation history had its origin in the narrative of the Fall, an event for which there was no historical evidence, and developed into a history of God’s call (election) to all people that they should be brought together in community. It was a history that was linked with the divine logos, a force that Christian theology has seen as deeply interwoven into creation from the beginning of time and that was made human in Jesus.Terrence Merrigan (KU Leuven, Belgium), giving a Christian perspective on the second theme, distinguished three quests or attempts to reach the historical Jesus. The first, from 1774 to 1906, sought to uncover the Jesus that had been obscured by dogma. It imploded with the realization that separating “core” from “myth” was impossible, and conditioned a reactive “no-quest” in the first half of the twentieth century. A “new quest” arose in the 1950s, initiated by Käsemann’s reaction to the theologies of Barth and Bultmann. A further quest that appealed to archaeology and the... (shrink)

In this work, Brian Philip Dunn focuses on the South Indian theologian A. J. Appasamy's "embodiment theology." This is the first book on Appasamy, a not insignificant Indian, Christian theologian. This study argues for the distinctive theological voice of Appasamy who develops a theology strongly influenced by the medieval Hindu theologian Ramanuja, in particular offering a reading of the Gospel of John. Dunn shows how Appasamy sees the Christian God in Ramanuja's theology and how his theology, particularly about the (...) presence of God in the icon in a temple, can become a heuristic device through which to understand the fourth Gospel in the context of its own time. This allows the reader to develop a rooted Christology that otherwise would remain hidden. Through Ramanuja, Appasamy can contribute to a constructive and important Theology that grounds the text and ideas of the incarnation in the Jewish context, particularly about priestly atonement. This reading of Ramanuja allows us to see a Christology in the Christian text that would otherwise not have been seen. (shrink)

In a recent paper, John J. Park argues (1) that an abstract object can bring a universe into existence, and (2) that, according to the Big Bang Theory, the initial singularity is an abstract object that brought the universe into existence. According to Park, if (1) and (2) are true, then the kalam cosmological argument fails to show that the cause of the universe must be divine. I argue, however, that both (1) and (2) are false. In my (...) argument I analyse the abstract/concrete distinction and conclude that, by its nature, an abstract object is causally inefficacious in the sense that it cannot bring something into existence. (shrink)

Late in his life, Hans-Georg Gadamer was asked to explain what the universal aspect of hermeneutics consisted in, and he replied, enigmatically, “in the _verbum interius_.” Gadamer devoted a pivotal section of his magnum opus, _Truth and Method_, to this Augustinian concept, and subsequently pointed to it as a kind of passkey to his thought. It remains, however, both in its origins and its interpretations, a mysterious concept. From out of its layered history, it remains a provocation to thought, expressing (...) something about the relation of language and understanding that has yet to be fully worked out. The scholastic idea of a word that is fully formed in the mind but not articulated served Augustine as an analogy for the procession of the Trinity, and served Thomas Aquinas as an analogy for the procession between divine ideas and human thought. Gadamer turned the analogy on its head by using the verbum interius to explain the obscure relation between language and human understanding. His learned interpretation of the idea of the inner word through Neoplatonism, Lutheranism, idealism, and historicism may seem nearly as complex as the medieval source texts he consulted and construed in his exegesis, but the profoundity of his insights are unquestioned. In unpacking Gadamer's interpretive feat, John Arthos provides an overview of the philosophy of the logos out of which the _verbum interius_ emerged. He summarizes the development of the _verbum _in ancient and medieval doctrine, traces its path through German thought, and explains its relevance to modern hermeneutic theory. His work unfolds in two parts, as an expansive intellectual history and as a close analysis and commentary on source texts on the inner word, from Augustine to Gadamer. As such, this book serves as an indispensable guide and reference for hermeneutics and the intellectual traditions out of which it arose, as well as an original theoretical statement in its own right. “Consummately researched, lucidly written, and persuasively argued throughout, __The Inner Word_ _succeeds brilliantly in bringing to light this neglected but pivotal matter in Gadamer’s work. Arthos is learned in the best ‘humanist’ way, for he succeeds in creating something new of his own that will speak eloquently to all of us.” —_Walter Jost, University of Virginia_ “Gadamer suggests that the Christian idea of incarnation is a key to his hermeneutics, but does not explain his position in a detailed or systematic manner. Arthos brings his considerable knowledge of hermeneutics and rhetoric to bear on Gadamer's insight, recounting the rich intellectual history to which Gadamer gestures, and providing an extended and detailed exegesis of this pivotal point in the third part of _Truth and Method_. Gadamer's account of 'linguisticality,' Arthos explains, can best be understood through his use of a complex metaphor—the ‘inner word.’ Arthos matches his erudition with clear and clean prose, and his account exemplifies, rather than just describes, Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy. Any scholar interested in Gadamer's philosophy should have this book on his or her shelf.” —_Francis J. Mootz III, William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law_ “Arthos's strength lies for me in his careful reading of the sources. He effectively commands the literature on the subject. This work shows in a sophisticated way the legacy of trinitarian theology for philosophical hermeneutics. The very complex task of illuminating the phenomenon of the _verbum interius _and indicating its centrality for philosophical hermeneutics is accomplished by John Arthos with great sensitivity to the subject matter.” —_Andrzej Wiercinski, The International Institute for Hermeneutics_. (shrink)

This book contains some rare combinations: first, an author who is as concerned with conceptual clarification as he is with the absolute truthfulness of the biblical text; second, an argument that avoids the common "either-ors" and contends for the importance of both divine sovereignty and divine solicitude in equal measure; third, an approach that espouses divine determinism and divine temporality. No One Like Him takes on the most intractable intellectual challenges of contemporary evangelical theology. Kevin Vanhoozer (...) , Research Professor of Systematic Theology, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School John Feinberg judicially reconstructs aspects of the classical view of God in a way that proves more faithful than process and openness of God theisms. Arguably, this is the best study of theology proper in print. Bruce Demarest , Professor of Theology and Spiritual Formation, Denver Seminary Feinberg reads theology with a philosopher's eye and writes it with a philosopher's sensitivity to illogic and incoherence. J. I. Packer , Professor of Theology, Regent College A magisterial work, one that truly deserves to be called a magnum opus....It reveals its author as...perhaps the only modern scholar whose work, like that of Carl. F. H. Henry, can compare in size, detail, comprehensiveness, and intellectual acuity with the accomplishments of the late Karl Barth.... It is not risky to predict that Feinberg's No One Like Him will come to be a milestone in evangelical theology. Harold O. J. Brown , Professor of Philosophy and Theology, Reformed Theological Seminary. (shrink)

Kant both says that we should recognize our duties as God’s commands, and objects to the theological version of heteronomy, ‘which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will’. In this paper I discuss how these two views fit together, and in the process I develop a notion of autonomous submission to divine moral authority. I oppose the ‘constitutive’ view of autonomy proposed by J. B. Schneewind and Christine Korsgaard. I locate Kant’s objection to theological heteronomy against (...) the background of Crusius’s divine command theory, and I compare Kant’s views about divine authority and human political authority. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 357 chorus of Protestants calling for a recovery of church discipline, of use of creed and sacrament in worship, of christian education as character formation, etc. Unfortunately, he gives no suggestions about how much a. recovered sense of authority and sacramentalism can avoid the distortions of this necessary element of Church life that gave rise to the original Protestant Reformation (distortions recognized and warned against at Vatican (...) II). Those engaged in Christian ministry in North America from all Christian traditions will find this book a helpful tool in deepening their theological reflection on (and in) ministry. Catholics and Arminians will :find it particularly amenable to their theological convietions. Catholics will identify with the ecclesial and sacramental sense. Both they and Arminians will find that Lee's degnostification of the doctrine of total depravity -by claiming this affirmation of fallenness is an imagined state apart from the graciousness of God (86)-sounds familiar: compare Rahner's "supernatural existential" and Arminius's "preventient grace." (Unfortunately, Lee misses this similarity because he accepts the classic caricature of Arminians as denying the need for grn.ce, cf. 103)" Could there be a correlation between Lee's more pastoral approach to theology and the narrowing of this classic theological distinction~ One can only hope. RANDY L. MADDOX Sioux Falls College Sioux Falls, Smith Dakota Darwinism and Dfrinity: Essays on Evolution and Religious Belief. By JOHN DURANT, Ed. Oxg·ord: Basil Blackwell, 1985, Pp. ix + 210. Cloth, $25.00. The work is based largely upon a collection of papers. delivered in 1982 at a conference on the relationship behveen evolutionary theory and relig ·ious. belief sponsored by the British Society for the History of Science. It consists of a brief Introduction, and seven chapters ranging in content from a general review by the editor of the problems which still persist in our day for anyone attempting a consistent interpretation of Darwin a8 a person and Darwinism as a doctrine in science, to topics.such as the popularization of Darwinism via writers such as Spencer, the current relevance of Darwinism to contemporary Christian theology, the religious nature of evolutionism itself, and the "scientific creationism" debate in the United States. In his overview Dura11t emphasi2;es the point that in reeent years there 358 BOOK REVIEWS has been an increasing dissatisfaction among historians of science concerning the supposed conflict that there either is or should be between science and religion. The latter have been in fact more often than not in close association with each other, and often in harmony with one another. This is especially true with respect to religion and Darwin's Origin of Species, which Durant describes as the "last great work of Victorian natural theology " (p. 16). Foolish as this may at first sound to some, it is in fact much closer to the historical truth than the forced conflict theories which so dominated the earlier part of our eentmy. This is certainly true and will, I think, become more and more widely accepted as time goes on. What is not the case, though, and what not only Durant but others in the volume insist upon continuing to maintain, is that Darwin himself was not a "progressivist." Durant tries to make out that Darwin is the good guy because of his neutrality on the topic of necessary prog-ress in nature while Spene.er is the bad guy who is largely responsible for turning a nicely neutral scientific doctrine into a " metaphysical " system of the world. This, however, is not what Darwin himself had to say, both publicly and privately. In chapter 2 J. H. Brooke discusses the relationship between Darwin's science and his religion. What was Darwin's personal religious position'l Brooke states that "Despite the fluctuation of his religious beliefs, in both content and strength, a faiTiy consistent position does emerge" (p. 42). Darwin was certainly not an atheist. He may, though, have been some sort of deist. He was, in fact, very likely a theologian in his own manner, desiring to offer the world a new and scientific alternative to the traditional theology of Paley and the Church of England. In any event, even though it is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM AND THE THOMISTIC TEXTS JOHN F. x. KNASAS Genter for Thomistic Studies Houston, Temas SOME THIRTY YEARS ago in the journal Thought, there appeared an article by Fr. Joseph Donceel, S.J., entitled " A Thomistic Misapprehension? " Its thesis is that American Thomism had seen too much of the a posteriori in Aquinas's noetic.1 In fact the interpretation was so a posteriori that it bordered on (...) empiricism and positivism. Donceel intends to balance the American understanding of Aquinas by spotlighting various Thomistic texts that speak of an a priori contribution of the intellect to human knowledge. Donceel is merely calling attention to something that some outstanding European Thomists, e.g., Defever, Marechal, and Rahner have known for some time. Donceel's " balanced" interpretation is what is called Transcendental Thomism. In sum, the position claims that the human intellect is not so complete a tabula rasa that it fails to make an a priori contribution to the data of sensation. This contribution is the intellect's very dynamism to Infinite Being. The dynamism has a constitutive role in human experience. Swept up within this intellectual torrent, the data of sensation stand before us in consciousness as finite and limited. So " objectified " the data are disposed for the traditional abstvactive account of the specific and generic natures. After the Second Vatican Council, Thomism generally fell into disrepute among American Catholic intellectuals. Phi1 Joseph Donceel, " A Thomistic Misapprehension?" Thought, 32 (1957) : 189. 81 82 JOHN F. X. KNASAS losophy departments " pluralized." Their members represented analytic, existential, and process philosophy.2 If Thomism remained vibrant, it was in the a priori strain. Both on the philosophical and theological levels, it was at home with the pluralism tha.t marked the time.3 The current emphasis on political activism, however, ha:s caused even Transcendental Thomism to suffer an eclipse. In the heat of political struggle, Transcendental Thomism, too, appears decadent and bourgeois. The case can be made, though, that the uncovering of the intellect's a priori dynamism to the Infinite was a crucial move for liberationists. Gutierrez notes 4 that the Transcendental Thomist understanding of the human intellect posits a single finality for human nature. The traditional distinction between the temporal and eternal planes loses meaning. Human history becomes salvation history. In this way, then, Transcendental Thomism continues to exercise its influence. This paper investigates the purported Thomistic texts expressing an apriorism. The texts cited by Donceel are all found in Marechal's Cahier V.5 There MarechaI mentions many others besides. Hence, my paper will use the Marechalian collection. My treatment focuses upon the texts that are seemingly most a priori. I. A central text for Marechal is De Veritate, q.l, a.4, ad 5m (first set). Aquinas remarks: 2 See "Is a 'Catholic' Philosophy Department Possible? " by the Committee on Research (Thomas I.angan, K. I,. Schmitz, Jude P. Dougherty) of the ACPA (HJ78). 3 On Transcendental Thomism's capacity to admit a theological pluralism without falling into a relativism, see Gerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Gent1.ry (New York: The Seab1iry Pres8, 1977), pp. 258-9. 4 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. by Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 69. 5 Oahier V is a volume in Jl.riarechal's monumenfal Le point de depart de la metaphysique. Subsequent references to Oahier V are from Donceel's substantive translation A J,[wrechal Reader (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM AND THE TEXTS 83 The truth by which the soul passes judgment on all things is the first truth; for, just as from the truth of the divine intellect there flow into the angelic intellects those: intelligible species by which angels know all things, so does the truth of the first principles by which we judge everything proceed from the truth of the divine intellect as from its exemplary cause. Since we can judge by means of the truth of these first principles only insofar as this truth is a likeness of the first truth, we are said to judge everything according to the first truth.6 The text illustrates a " dynamic exemplarism " in Aquinas... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE HISTORICAL CONDITIONING OF CHURCH DOCTRINE* JOHN R. T. LAMONT Winnipeg, Canada I WISH to set out and defend a certain conception of what is involved in accepting the teachings of the Catholic Church. This conception is at odds with some contemporary understandings of the way in which such teachings are historically conditioned. I will argue that these conceptions are mistaken, and state what I think to be (...) the correct understanding of the historical conditioning of dogma. I Possession of the Catholic faith is usually understood to involve belief in the doctrines infallibly taught by the Catholic Church, so that outward profession of, and inward assent to, those doctrines, whether explicit or implicit, is a necessary condition for being a Catholic. I do not intend to discuss which particular doctrines are infallibly taught, or how exactly one determines that a doctrine is infallibly taught. I will simply assume that there are such doctrines, and that it is possible to determine that they are infallibly taught, and go on to ask the question, What does acceptance of these doctrines consist in? (The simpler expression "teachings of the Church" will be used to mean "infallible teachings of the Church" in the rest of this paper.) I propose this answer: • This paper had its origin in the lectures prepared for the author's philosophy of religion course at Chishawasha Seminary, Harare. The author would like to thank Fr. Norman Tanner, S.J., Fr. J.M. R. Tillard, O.P., and his colleagues at the Seminary and the University of Manitoba, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 511 512 JOHN R. T. LAMONT F). To accept the teachings of the Church is to believe that the propositions expressed by the sentences taught by the Church are true. Some comment on F) is necessary in order to make its meaning clear. A) "Propositions" Propositions, according to philosophers and logicians,1 possess the following characteristics. They are i) the bearers of truth or falsity. Whatever can be described as true, or as false, is a proposition. ii) the meanings of meaningful sentences. Different sentences can mean the same thing; for instance, the English sentence "Snow is white" and the French sentence "La neige est blanche" mean the same thing. What these two sentences have in common-what they mean-is a proposition. iii) the objects of cognitive, or propositional, attitudes. Such attitudes include knowing, doubting, wishing, disbelieving, suspending judgment about, expecting. When you know something or disbelieve something, what you know or disbelieve is a proposition. When you hope for something or fear that something might happen, what you hope for or fear is that some proposition might be true. Since the teachings of the Church are things that can be believed or disbelieved, are held to be true (by Catholics) and false (by some non-Catholics), and are expressed by sentences,' it follows that they are propositions.3 B) "Propositions expressed by sentences" Humans communicate propositions to each other by means of sentences. A sentence is a physical object, or a physical happening; ' See, for example, the introduction to Propositions and Attitudes, edited by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (Oxford, 1988). I have tried to describe in a previous paper the sort of reasons that have led philosophers to maintain that propositions are the objects of cognitive attitudes such as knowing, believing, or hoping ("The Nature of Revelation," New Blackfriars [July-August 1991]: 335-45). 2 I do not mean to assert here that all the Church's teachings are expressed in sentences, only that the Church does at times express her teachings in sentences (which is undeniable). It is possible for the Church to teach through actions, such as liturgical actions, as well as through sentences. However, since what is taught in such actions will be something that can be known and believed, such teachings will be propositions. 3 The question whether the teachings of the Church are propositions is not the same as the question whether divine revelation is propositional-whether divine revelation consists wholly or partly of propositions communicated by God to humans. I have argued (in "The Nature of Revelation") that revelation is at least partly propositional. However, the THE CONDITIONING... (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: ch. 1 The Cry of Rachel -- Maritain's 1942 Marquette Aquinas Lecture -- Maritain's The Person and the Common Good -- Camus's The Plague -- ch. 2 Joy -- Being as the Good and the Eruption of Willing -- Being and Philosophical Psychology -- An Ordinary Knowledge of God and Metaphysics -- Metaphysics as Implicit Knowledge -- Being and the Intellectual Emotions -- ch. 3 Quandoque Evils -- Aquinas's Rationale for the Corruptible Order -- The Corruptible (...) Order and Quandoque Evils -- Bracketing Quandoque Evils between Goods -- A Caveat in Understanding the Subject of the Consequent Good -- The Effect of Human Providence upon the Frequency of Quandoque Evils -- ch. 4 Natural Corruptions -- Death as a Natural Corruption -- Natural Corruption as Nondefinitive -- Ambiguity of "Praeter Intentionem" and "Per Accidens" -- God and the Evil of Punishment (Poena) -- Other Interpretations -- Abraham and Isaac -- Conclusion -- ch. 5 Preliminaries to Aquinas and the Contemporary Discussion -- C.G. III, 71: "If Evil Exists, God Exists" -- William Rowe on Cosmological Reasoning -- De Ver. X, 12, ad 10m: "If not God from Justice, then God from Some Other Effect" -- Summary of Aquinas on the Existence of Evil -- A Strategy -- ch. 6 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Personalist Theodicies -- Marilyn McCord Adams and "Horrendous Evils" -- William Hasker: Personal Satisfaction and World Approval -- John Hick: Creation as a Gymnasium for the Development of Our Virtues -- David Ray Griffin and the Denial of Genuine Evils -- The Brothers Karamazov -- Thomistic "Natural Desires" of the Human Person -- ch. 7 The Thomist and the Contemporary Discussion: Cosmological Theodicies -- Diogenes Allen and Suffering as an Experience of God -- David Hume and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, X and XI -- William Rowe and "Pointless Evils" -- J. L. Mackie and Further Objections to a Cosmological Theodicy -- Mackie's Fourth Criticism and Aquinas on the Causality of Human Choices -- Aquinas and Plantinga -- The Avoidance of Determinism -- The Avoidance of Divine Culpability -- A Thomistic Free Will Defense? -- Richard Swinburne: Nature as a Necessary Display Case for Our Knowledge of Good and Evil -- Bruce Reichenbach: Developing Plantinga and Swinburne -- ch. 8 Conclusion and Comparison to Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump -- Brian Davies's Apophatic Treatment of the Evil Problem -- Eleonore Stump and the Love of God -- The Consolation of Rachel. (shrink)

David Hume's greatness depends in large part on how his writings hint at beautiful and coherent theories which are recognizably Humean despite their divergences from the untidy originals. Now, perhaps the clearest vision of a contradiction–free Platonic Form of Hume was had by J. L. Mackie; he described it in such masterpieces as The Cement of the Universe, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, and The Miracle of Theism. How successful is this last in its attack on theism? I shall discuss (...) Mackie's case against theism of a Platonic or Neoplatonic type which replaces ‘God as a person or mind or spirit’ by a more abstract Creative Force or Principle. Mackie sees in it a ‘a formidable rival’ to any theism treating of a divine being; ‘if you demand an ultimate explanation, then this may well be a better one’ . But, his chapter thirteen contends, it fares badly in competition with an atheistic, naturalistic approach. (shrink)

Our world seems fine tuned in life-permitting ways. If the cosmos contains many universes, only the appropriately tuned ones can be seen by living beings. An alternative is that God acted as Fine Tuner. We might account for God in terms of an eternally powerful ethical requirement that God exists, rejecting J. L. Mackie's judgment that absolute ethical requirements are incredibly queer. Mackie viewed such requirements as logically possible, so if they were absent then this would seem a matter of (...) synthetic necessity. Again, if they existed then their creative effectiveness would, Mackie thought, be logically possible. Their actual ineffectiveness would thus involve a further synthetic necessity. Theists could maintain that the synthetic necessities were instead ones making ethical requirements real and creatively powerful. Yet why, then, would there exist anything but divine knowledge of everything worth knowing? A spinozistic answer is that such knowledge is all that exists. (shrink)

Life, work, and influences -- Life -- Work -- Influences -- Metaphysics -- The intelligible world -- The existence of the intelligible world -- The intelligible and the divine world -- The intelligible and the natural world -- Knowledge -- Mind and body -- The souls of animals -- Knowledge : thought and souls -- Knowledge : God -- Mediate knowledge : external world -- Discussion and assessment of Norris's theory -- Was Norris an idealist? -- Faith and reason (...) -- The Socinian controversy -- Faith -- Reason -- Above reason and contrary to reason -- The measure of truth -- Faith and reason -- Malebranche -- Descartes -- Locke -- Love -- The theory of love -- The regulation of love -- The measure of divine love -- Controversy with Locke -- Norris's criticisms of Locke -- Locke's responses -- Concluding comments. (shrink)

The concept of prayer didn’t exist until the first step outside the garden. And Adam and Eve’s prayers had to be maddened ones, predicated upon a new and shockingly acquired paranoidic consciousness, completely unlike their prelapserian paranoic1 state wherein the primal couple didn’t know hope or prayer inside the amoral edenic, in the egregious garden where anything was possible anytime.And that is why you don’t notice the word “good” in the original account of creation in Genesis; that is, the “J” (...) account, written around 1000 B.C.E. during the reign of Solomon—the account wherein Adam and Eve are formed of the dust of the earth and given life through the intimacy of divine breath, with God planting the garden... (shrink)

In theology, by W.L. Rowe.--Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, by A. Kenny.--Some puzzles concerning omnipotence, by G.I. Mavrodes.--The paradox of the stone, by C.W. Savage.--Creation ex nihilo, by J. Donnelly.--The miraculous, by R.F. Holland.--On miracles, by P.J. Dietl.--The tacit structure of religious knowing, by J.H. Gill.--On the observability of the self, by R.M. Chisholm.--Re-examining Kierkegaard's "Teleological suspension of the ethical," by J. Donnelly.

The historical context of the philosophical work of St. Thomas Aquinas, by D. Knowles.--Form and existence, by P. Geach.--Categories, by H. McCabe.--Analogy as a rule of meaning for religious language, by J. F. Ross.--Nominalism, by P. Geach.--St. Thomas' doctrine of necessary being, by P. Brown.--The proof ex motu for the existence of God; logical analysis of St. Thomas' arguments, by J. Salamucha.--Infinite causal regression, by P. Brown.--St. Thomas Aquinas and the language of total dependence, by J. N. Deck.--Divine foreknowledge (...) and human freedom, by A. Kenny.--Intellect and imagination in Aquinas, by A. Kenny.--The immortality of the soul, by H. McCabe.--Aquinas on intentionality, by P. Sheehan.--The scholastic theory of moral law in the modern world, by A. Donagan.--The first principle of practical reason, by G. G. Grisez. (shrink)

Over the past 25 years, no religious institution in America has done more to explore the link between the environment and spirituality than the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Now, for the first time, a selection of the finest of the Cathedral's ecological sermons appears in a single volume.